The Dual Concerns Model is the framework that explains why two equally intelligent negotiators, facing identical situations, will choose radically different strategies and produce radically different outcomes. Developed initially by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton in the 1960s and refined by Dean Pruitt and others through the 1980s, the model maps negotiation behavior along two independent axes: concern for your own outcomes and concern for the counterparty's outcomes. The position you occupy on those two axes determines, more than any tactical choice, what kind of negotiator you actually are.
The Two Axes That Define Strategy
The vertical axis measures assertiveness, the degree to which you prioritize your own outcomes. The horizontal axis measures cooperativeness, the degree to which you care about the counterparty's outcomes. The two are independent. High concern for your own outcomes does not require low concern for theirs, and vice versa. This independence is the model's central insight, because it disposes of the false dichotomy that frames assertiveness and cooperation as opposites.
The model produces five characteristic strategies. Competing is high assertiveness and low cooperation, the zero-sum posture of someone trying to win the deal at the counterparty's expense. Accommodating is low assertiveness and high cooperation, conceding to preserve the relationship at the cost of your own outcomes. Avoiding is low on both axes, withdrawing from the negotiation rather than engaging. Compromising is moderate on both, the conventional middle path of splitting differences. Collaborating is high on both, working to maximize joint outcomes by surfacing interests and inventing options.
The model is descriptive before it is prescriptive. It does not argue that one strategy is universally correct. It argues that the strategy you choose should fit the situation, and that most negotiators choose poorly because they have a default style they apply regardless of context.
Why Most Negotiators Default to One Strategy
Every negotiator has a comfort zone on the dual-concerns grid. Some default to competing because they were trained to view negotiation as a contest. Some default to accommodating because they prize relationships over outcomes. Some default to compromising because it feels fair and lets both parties exit with dignity. These defaults are usually unconscious and they persist across situations that call for different responses.
The consequence is predictable underperformance. The habitual competitor wins the deal but burns the relationship, then loses access to future deals that would have been more valuable than the one they won. The habitual accommodator preserves the relationship but accepts terms that compound into structural disadvantage over time. The habitual compromiser leaves money on the table by reflexively splitting differences when one party could have captured more of the surplus through better analysis. The habitual avoider misses deals that were available simply because the conversation never happened.
The value of the model is that it surfaces these defaults and gives you a vocabulary for choosing a different strategy when the situation calls for one.
When Each Strategy Actually Fits
Competing fits when the stakes are high, the relationship is genuinely disposable, and your power position is strong. One-shot distributive negotiations, hostile acquisitions, and certain regulatory disputes all qualify. The mistake is using competing in settings where the relationship matters, which describes most professional negotiation. A competitor who wins a sourcing negotiation by squeezing a critical supplier may discover later that the supplier deprioritizes their orders, or simply stops bidding on future work.
Accommodating fits when the issue at stake is genuinely more important to the counterparty than to you, when the relationship is more valuable than the substance, or when you have made a mistake and need to repair credibility. The accommodator who concedes strategically on a low-priority issue and banks the goodwill is making a sophisticated move. The accommodator who concedes by default on everything is not.
Avoiding fits when the stakes are trivial, when timing is wrong, or when more information is needed before any useful conversation can happen. It is also the right move when the cost of engagement exceeds the value of any possible outcome. The mistake is avoiding because you are uncomfortable rather than because the situation justifies it.
Compromising fits when time pressure is severe, when interests are genuinely opposed, and when collaboration is impossible. It is the default that produces acceptable outcomes when better outcomes are unreachable. The error is reaching for compromise prematurely, before any value-creation work has been attempted, which is what most negotiators do most of the time.
Collaborating fits when both parties have ongoing relationships, when interests are complex enough to admit creative trades, and when there is time to do the analytical work that collaboration requires. This is the strategy that maximizes total value, and it is also the most demanding to execute. Negotiators who claim to be collaborating while skipping the interest-mapping and option-generation work are usually just compromising with better marketing.
Reading the Counterparty on the Same Grid
The model is most powerful when applied to both sides of the table. The counterparty has their own defaults, which you can read from their behavior. A counterparty who opens with extreme positions and refuses to discuss interests is operating in competing mode. A counterparty who agrees quickly to terms that should require negotiation is accommodating. A counterparty who proposes splitting every difference is compromising. A counterparty who asks about your underlying interests and proposes trades across multiple dimensions is collaborating.
Reading their strategy tells you which moves will work. Tactical empathy and option generation are wasted on a counterparty operating in pure competing mode; you need to harden your BATNA and either match their posture or change the strategic context. Conversely, attempting to compete against a counterparty who is signaling collaboration is a missed opportunity. You will win the immediate transaction at a structural cost to a relationship that could have produced more value over time.
Shifting Strategies Within a Single Negotiation
The sophisticated move is to shift positions on the grid within a single negotiation as the situation evolves. Open with collaborating to surface interests and generate options. Shift to compromising on the issues where collaboration produced no viable trade. Shift to competing on a specific term where your priority is high and the counterparty's is low. Shift to accommodating on a term where the reverse is true.
This is hard to execute because it requires self-awareness about which mode you are currently in and conscious choice about when to change. Most negotiators stay locked in one mode for the duration of the conversation, regardless of whether the mode is producing results. The Dual Concerns Model gives you the vocabulary to recognize what you are doing and to choose differently.
The Bottom Line
The Dual Concerns Model is less a tactical framework than a diagnostic one. It does not tell you what to do. It tells you what you are doing and what alternatives are available. Negotiators who internalize the grid become harder to predict, more flexible across contexts, and consistently more effective than those who play a single style well. The strategic move is not to find your style. It is to escape having one.